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I. INTRODUCTION 
Presidential elections often are good barometers of the 
national mood, though their fullest implications are likely best 
read in hindsight rather than on the eve of the primaries. 
Nevertheless, a fair reading of the 2012 national mood, as of this 
pre-election day writing, is that the American people are divided 
between a vision of government as ally versus government as 
antagonist. On the partisan poles are those who may be 
described as strongly and consistently pro-government in their 
leanings, on the one end, and those who are strongly and 
consistently libertarian, on the other end. Although most 
Americans likely lie in between these statism poles, and 
selectively invoke the benefits or harms of government power, 
broad-strokes political rhetoric today increasingly rings 
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2. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law. Associate 
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3. Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University 
School of Law. 
4. Regents' Professor, Milton 0. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law. and Dean 
Emerita, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. 
383 
384 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:383 
libertarian bells. Anxiety about government efficacy, 
government wisdom, and government expanse has prompted 
conservatives and liberals alike to ask whether, and in what 
contexts, government assistance is a welcome means of assuring 
that individuals can fulfill their potential as well as assuring that 
the country can realize collective goals, versus an unwelcome, 
"nanny state" intrusion into individual freedoms. 
In the scholarly version of these wider political debates, the 
discussion about the limits of government power over individual 
freedoms sometimes is couched in terms of communitarian 
versus liberal visions of government power, and how American 
constitutional law shapes each vision. Influential communitarian 
scholars for years have critiqued strong liberal theories of rights 
on the ground that they "exalt rights over responsibilities, 
licensing irresponsible conduct and spawning frivolous assertions 
of rights at the expense of encouraging personal responsibility 
and responsibility to community" (p. 1). In their view, limiting 
government power in the interest of preserving individual liberty 
has contributed to an erosion of the public good, and a 
weakening of civic virtue. Civil liberties and civil rights, as they 
have evolved since the 1960s, have imposed significant social 
costs that have mounted in ways that seriously compromise our 
collective well-being. According to these critics, "liberty as 
license"- that is, an approach to rights that takes them too 
absolutely- has been pursued instead of an "ordered liberty" 
that bows more deeply to the common good and that takes the 
responsibility part of the rights/responsibility balance more 
seriously (p. 1 ). 
Central to this debate is how much, and in what contexts, 
government should be allowed to inculcate civic virtue. At what 
point does government intervention impern1issibly erode 
individual and private associational autonomy? For example, is a 
federal command that all Americans do their part to assure 
affordable health insurance for all by purchasing insurance or 
suffering tax consequences an expression of "ordered liberty" or 
an undue invasion of liberty? Is a decision by a young and 
apparently healthy person to forgo purchase of health insurance 
irresponsible? A decision to undergo an early-terrn abortion? To 
enter into a same-sex relationship? Or, are all of these decisions 
ones that a liberal constitutional order properly must leave to 
the individual with little or no government restrictions? 
How, if at all, do the classic communitarian arguments in 
favor of allowing government to inculcate civic virtue stack up 
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against the realities of governance? Do growing concerns about 
government dysfunction, gridlock, corruption, and hyper-
partisanship undermine or fortify the communitarian arguments 
against liberal rights where they conflict with a "common good"? 
Finally, are communitarians right to insist that the recognition of 
liberal rights in fact requires or encourages government (and 
others) to suspend critical judgment of the decisions in ways that 
obscure the costs of rights, the "wrongness" of behaviors that 
nevertheless receive legal protection, and their potential harm to 
others? 
James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain have authored an 
important and intellectually accessible new book that canvasses 
the communitarian critique of a liberal theory of rights, and 
responds to its central claims. The book's arrival is especially 
well timed given the roiling national debate about the proper 
reach of government authority, and may offer an important 
corrective to some of the Constitution-based claims being made 
in these debates, if not to more general claims about a culture of 
selfishness. It also debuts at a moment when arguments for and 
against particular constitutional rights, such as reproductive 
rights, are gaining momentum. That is, the scope and content of 
constitutional liberalism are very much at issue, with some 
seeking more liberty and others favoring less restraint on 
government power. 
Building on decades of thoughtful scholarship that 
addresses communitarian and progressive objections to liberal 
theories of rights, the authors offer a persuasive response to 
arguments that cultural liberalism- the popular understanding 
and expression of liberal rights- is a natural extension of 
constitutional liberalism. As they explain, our constitutional 
liberalism, properly understood, is neither a deep font of strong 
libertarian principles that greatly restrict government power to 
inculcate virtues, nor a source of limitless government power to 
do so. Rather, it imposes a highly contextual brake on 
government power that rises and falls even within the context of 
so-called "fundamental rights" where liberty is most protected. 
The constitutional doctrine they discuss matters, because 
the doctrine is the framework within which American 
constitutional liberalism operates. This judge-made law affords 
government ample power to incentivize virtue, to inculcate 
values, and even to penalize or criminalize its version of 
individual "irresponsibility." In fact, libertarian complaints stem 
from a sense that the law offers individuals too little protection, 
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not too much. Consequently, the claim that constitutional 
liberalism has caused the alleged slide in our collective virtue by 
insisting on "empty toleration" of values and behaviors seems 
seriously overblown. Little in modern constitutional law or in 
actual government practice supports a narrow reading of 
government's moral authority, or a dichotomous reading of 
rights versus responsibilities. 
Fleming and McClain support this claim with several 
compelling constitutional examples. With each, they ask whether 
the law in fact requires government neutrality or "empty 
toleration." Their analysis shows that government neutrality is 
rarely required, even in zones of otherwise protected con-
stitutional privacy. For example, the constitutionally protected 
right to abortion does not compel the state to remain neutral 
regarding reproductive choices. Current law allows the 
government to weigh in on the exercise of this fundamental 
right, and many states now do so in increasingly forceful, non-
neutral, and moralizing ways (pp. 53-63, 69-73). 
Likewise, other fundamental rights-including freedom of 
expression- do not render government mute in the face of 
personal choices. Protection of harmful political expression-
such as excessively vitriolic and misleading characterizations of 
one's political opponents or lies about one's own 
accomplishments or about others" -does not prohibit official or 
private condemnation of dirty politics or shameful falsehoods. 
Nor does protection of sexual autonomy or marital rights require 
government to remain agnostic regarding the responsible 
exercise of these rights. 
Also, government may be constitutionally required to 
protect individual rights, but it is not required to provide 
financial support for the exercise of the rights. It may do so, 
short of fairly limited and contested constitutional limits. This in 
turn gives government formidable power to in11uence private 
?ecisio~s-power that can look, and feel, more coercive than 
Instructive. 
Still another important caveat to constitutional liberalism is 
that it polices only government power, not private power. With 
the notable exception of the Thirteenth Amendment,7 which 
restricts private power directly, constitutional rights obtain vis-a-
5. See infra text accompanying notes 19-20. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
7. U.S. Const. amend. XIII. 
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vis government authority, not private authority. The so-called 
"state action doctrine"8 is a profoundly significant limit on the 
reach of constitutional rights that is often neglected in arguments 
against expansive civil liberties. 
Finally, constitutional liberalism respects rights on a 
continuum. The constitutional practice entails a balance between 
rights and responsibility, between government and private 
power, not an aU-or-nothing choice between them. It identifies 
rights, and grants the judiciary power to police them. But judges 
do so in a context, and according to standards, that typically-
not rarely-require deference to the politically accountable 
branches of government. 
The constitutional case law therefore can accommodate 
communitarian arguments about the balance between rights and 
responsibilities. In each area of constitutional rights, the law 
offers rules and important exceptions. Due process protects 
reproductive privacy, except when it does not.9 Freedom of 
expression prohibits government limits on political speech, 
except when its national security consequences seem too great. 10 
The First Amendment requires accommodation of religious 
pluralism, except when it may leave "public education in 
shreds." 11 The case law allows for family autonomy, except when 
it costs too much in terms of a collective interest in child physical 
well-being and capacity for meaningful adult autonomy and 
citizenship. 12 Constitutional law, unsurprisingly, tracks a wider 
cultural ambivalence about unbridled freedom from regulatory 
and social constraints, versus national or local government 
insistence on conformity. 
8. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 
313, 318 (1879); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875). 
9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124 (2007) (upholding on facial challenge 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). 
10. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian ·Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (uphold-
ing restrictions on support provided to foreign terrorist organizations challenged on 
freedom of expression grounds). 
11. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 255 (1948) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) ("If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of the warring 
sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in 
shreds."). 
12. Compare Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that state law 
unconstitutionally interfered with parental right to control the upbringing of one's 
children by prohibiting parochial school education), with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745 (1982) (recognizing state right to terminate parental rights if need to do so is proven 
by clear and convincing evidence). 
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This is why, even in the current hyper-partisan climate,n 
people on both sides of the electable political aisle (though not 
at their farthest edges) can plausibly invoke constitutional law as 
a basis for their claims. The law is broad enough to support both 
a moderate liberal and a moderate conservative spin on the 
proper reach of government power over individual "rights." 
What is missing from many of these spins on constitutional law, 
however, is open acknowledgement of how strong claims in 
either direction have to be qualified by significant doctrine that 
belies them. 
This is also why scholarly debates between moderate 
communitarian and moderate liberal visions of rights, upon 
closer examination, turn less on the alleged fundamentals of 
constitutional liberalism than on its specific applications. Neither 
side of this particular scholarly debate denies the in1portance of 
virtues or of rights. Communitarians concede the need for rights, 
and moderate liberals concede the need for virtue. As such, the 
dichotomy between them is easily overstated. 
Fleming and McClain get this. They respectfully engage 
both sides of this theoretical debate and guide the reader to the 
following, sensible insight: constitutional liberalism cannot 
plausibly be blamed for any of the alleged excesses of our 
cultural liberalism. It can only be blamed- or praised- for 
adding liberal rights to our cultural vocabulary, and thereby 
asking government to moderate, but not abandon, its civic virtue 
impulses. 
The authors conclude that the liberal rights vocabulary and 
the individual liberty values it represents are very much worth 
preserving, even though communitarians and liberal theorists 
may disagree on where to draw the liberal rights lines. They 
endorse a moderate form of constitutional "perfectionism" that 
makes space for government encouragement of virtue and 
responsibility, but not for compelled moral conformity or 
coercion. They also-notably-include a feminist perspective on 
liberal responsibility and ordered liberty. 
Government can, in their view, cultivate virtue in a manner 
that respects freedom (p. 179). The liberal appeal to choice, 
autonomy, and toleration is not inherently in conflict with a 
13. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT 
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW 
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012) (describing the current state of partisan political 
gridlock). 
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republican appeal to moral goods- at least it is not "in a liberal 
republican constitutional democracy such as our own" (p. 180). 
Government may, and should, both support rights and engage in 
a formative project that affirmatively instills the non-neutral 
virtues of liberal citizenship (p. 183). A central aim of this 
formative project should be to cultivate respect for public reason 
and for individual dignity (pp. 188-89). 
II. FALSE DICHOTOMIES 
Among the most important contributions of the Fleming 
and McClain book is its demonstration that those who indict 
constitutional liberalism for enervating civic virtues rely on a 
false dichotomy between rights and responsibilities. As the 
authors show, there actually are multiple false dichotomies 
operating here. 
A. RIGHTS VERSUS RESPONSIBILITIES 
The book spends considerable time on the primary 
dichotomy of rights versus responsibilities. The focus is the 
influential work of Mary Ann Glendon from the early 1990s that 
critiques American "rights talk" on the ground that it is silent on 
responsibilities in ways that other countries' versions of rights 
are not (pp. 21-48). The silence is particularly lamentable in the 
modern world, she argues, because the "seedbeds of virtue" that 
once supplemented the constitutional text-such as strong 
families, associations, and collective moral and religious norms-
have eroded (p. 24). Absent these cultural cords, Americans 
have only law to bind them, and its liberal strands are too thin to 
inspire collective virtue. We have come to regard our political 
birthright as freedom from morality and responsibility, not an 
inherited obligation to respect their dictates. Our national rights-
centered (and self-centered) vocabulary is about our individual 
entitlements rather than about our common obligations, and our 
nation is the poorer for it. 
But as Fleming and McClain explain, one cannot draw the 
causal arrow so directly from our actual constitutional liberalism 
to this cultural construction of liberalism- even assuming it is an 
accurate depiction of what "we" think about our collective 
duties. Glendon and others critical of liberal rights often treat 
the early work of Ronald Dworkin, which describes rights as 
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"trumps," 14 as "the bete nair of [their] charges of irresponsibility" 
(p. 1). 
These communitarian arguments miss the mark, for two 
reasons. First, Dworkin may have insisted that rights are 
"trumps," and may have urged a strong version of liberal rights 
(pp. 22-23), but he did not mean all rights. His focus was on 
fundamental rights. Second, Dworkin clearly is not the 
authoritative voice of tnainstream constitutional liberalism. A 
better example of the latter might be Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, or his successor and former clerk, Chief Justice John 
Roberts. The better cultural and constitutional texts to examine 
to test the claim that constitutional rights talk has affected our 
cultural identity would be the judicial opinions that define the 
constitutional liberties, rather than academic tracts that analyze 
and critique these opinions. 
Fleming and McClain discuss key pieces of this case law and 
show why the case law does not support the claim that 
constitutional liberalism rejects responsibility or even is silent on 
it. Two of their most powerful examples are the cases on 
reproductive freedom and on freedom of speech. Especially in 
recent years, the former allows explicitly for government actors 
to weigh in on whether and how a woman should exercise her 
reproductive freedoms (pp. 68-75). In the abortion context in 
particular, the Court has emphasized that a womlan "cannot be 
isolated in her privacy;" 15 she is far from it, in fact. 
Even in the realm of freedom of speech, where the Court 
often is at its liberalism best, the full arc of the cases shows how 
much room government has to speak its own mind. The Court 
may insist that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric," 16 but it 
also permits significant government restraint of speech in 
bounded settings, in nonpublic fora, on broadcast media, when 
minors are likely to be present, when government is funding the 
expression, and especially when the Sfeech is properly regarded 
as the government's own message. 1 Constitutional liberalism 
allows for these forms of value-inflected, non-neutral restraints 
on freedom of expression. Likewise, liberalism theory is not in 
14. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977). 
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,159 (1973). 
16. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1971). 
17. See Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, 
and Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 375, 390-98 (2012) (discussing the limits of First Amendment protection and 
explaining why doctrine does not block all efforts to promote collective norms). 
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fatal tension with efforts to inspire responsible exercise of 
freedom of expression: for example, "government and other 
norm inculcators may have a liberalism-based interest in 
encouraging speakers to observe the habits of civility" in order 
to secure the conditions for the marketplace of ideas to work as 
intended, and have ample means of doing so.18 
Nor does the protection of speaker autonomy mean 
government actors are powerless to condemn the speaker, even 
in their official voice. Cases that celebrate expressive autonomy 
often include judicial homilies about the harms of that freedom, 
or the moral shortcomings of the speaker. The dissents are one 
source of this official moralizing;19 but the majority opinions too 
are written in ways that express respect for the right, but 
contempt for the countercultural messenger.2° Few people 
reading these opinions would come away with the sense that the 
protected speakers are cultural heroes, or that they should not 
suffer social ostracism or censure for their behavior. 
As the authors correctly observe, there also are other ways 
in which government can, does, and should put its meaty thumb 
on the values scale. In Chapter 5, they explain how government 
plays a role in promoting civic virtues through annual 
Constitution Day celebrations, civic education, and control of 
public school curricula (pp. 112-45). They applaud these efforts, 
provided the lessons learned are ones that respect liberal 
democratic values,21 or as Gerald Graff has put it, that "teach the 
conflicts."22 Of course, as the late 1980s-early 90s high octane 
debate about "cultural literacy" and calls for a nationally 
uniform curriculum demonstrated, these are never easy or 
noncontroversial lessons to craft.23 But few liberal theorists deny 
18. Id. at 399. 
19. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
20. See, e.g., U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(Kennedy, J.) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds, but 
stating about the respondent that "[l]ying was his habit" and describing his statements as 
"contemptible"). 
21. They appreciate the complexity of balancing the liberal interest in non-coercion 
and respect for plural values against the collective interest in assuring that children are 
effectively trained in the habits of citizenship and a non-neutral respect for shared values. 
As Mark Yudof said years ago, there is no "Archimedean point." Mark G. Yudof, 
Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 
IND. L.J. 527 (1984). 
22. See GERALD GRAFF, BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS: HOW TEACHING THE 
CONFLICTS CAN REVITALIZE AMERICAN EDUCATION (1992). See also AMY GUTMAN, 
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987). 
23. See TONI MARIE MASSARO, CONSTITUTIONAL LITERACY: A CORE 
CURRICULUM FOR A MULTICULTURAL NATION (1993) (discussing debate and proposing 
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the importance of common lessons for American children as a 
precondition to liberal adulthood,24 and all likely recognize the 
wisdom in Steven Shiffrin's observation that "children are the 
Achilles heel of liberal ideology."25 
Two other, profoundly important ways in which government 
may lend its moral voice to cultural conversations bear repeating 
here. First there is the so-called "government speech" exception, 
under which the Court has said government's own speech raises 
no First Amendment concern at all, apart from the 
Establishment Clause limits.26 That is, when the message is 
clearly government's own, versus that of a private individual, it 
need not be content- or even viewpoint-neutral. Second is the 
government's mighty purse-strings power, which includes the 
right to condition access to funding on decency criteria,27 on 
nondiscrimination criteria,2H and other non-neutral conditions. 
The latter power and its proper constitutional limits have been at 
the heart of current controversies over ethnic studies curricula29 
and religious student groups seeking official status (pp. 146-76):'0 
These controversies, like calls for civic education, bring to light 
how much power government reserves to make value-laden 
choices, despite our constitutional liberalism and even because 
of it. 
Last but surely not least is the state action doctrine,31 which 
Fleming and McClain do not address in detail. In Chapter 4, they 
balance between liberal and civic republican visions of a core curriculum). 
24. /d. at 138-40. 
25. Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,647 (1980). 
26. See Pleasant Grove City. Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 
27. See Nafl Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569. 572-73 (1998) 
(upholding congressional standards, on a facial challenge, that directed the National 
Endowment for the Arts to consider "general standards of decency and respect for the 
diverse beliefs and values of the American public" when evaluating the artistic merit of 
grant applications (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)(1994)). 
28. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002) (upholding 
voucher program that conditioned application of vouchers on commitment not to 
"advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion"). 
29. See Arizona House Bill 2281, which conditions state funding on not including 
courses or classes that "promote resentment toward a race or class of people" or that 
"advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals" and that 
allegedly was triggered by Tucson High School's Mexican-American Studies Program. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-112(A)(2), (4) (2012); see also H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
30. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); see also Toni M. 
Massaro, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 569, 
611-17 (2011 ). 
31. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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discuss civil society's role in "cultivating the 'seedbeds of virtue"' 
and outline the communitarian critique of the erosion of inter-
mediate organizations between the individual and government 
that are necessary to cultivating virtue (pp. 81-111). What is 
missing here is the fundamental distinction between con-
stitutional liberalism and rights imposed through democratic 
processes. If constitutional rights are the real threat to these 
intermediate institutions, then the peril is greatly mitigated by 
the fact that only government action can violate constitutional 
. h 12 ng ts.· 
In fact, as the authors recognize (pp. 98-101), a common 
criticism of constitutional liberalism is that it conceptualizes 
liberty as freedom from government, not from private parties 
who may exercise their authority over individuals in profoundly 
illiberal ways. The public/private split is not a natural one, or one 
that neatly divides public responsibilities from private liberties. 
Nevertheless, the arc of the modern state action cases bends 
deeply toward allowing significant government support of 
private actors without thereby transforming the latter into "state 
actors" for constitutional purposes.33 Private parties and 
intermediate social institutions therefore have wide constitu-
tional space in which to enforce their moral visions, even with 
government assistance. If anything, the worry should be over too 
little enforceable liberal autonomy and values agnosticism, 
rather than too much. 
B. NEGATIVE RIGHTS VERSUS POSITIVE RIGHTS 
Closely related to the state action point is the negative 
rights critique of liberalism. A primary criticism of liberal rights 
theories has always been- from the political left and the political 
right- that liberalism is about negative rights rather than 
positive rights. The liberal version of rights, under this account, 
is best captured by the notion of "freedom from'' government, 
and not "a charter of positive benefits imposing affirmative 
obligations upon government to secure the preconditions for ... 
justice" (p. 7). Progressive theorists condemn constitutional 
liberalism for its impoverished view of government responsibility 
to provide food, medical care, education, housing, employment, 
32. A notable exception here is the Thirteenth Amendment. See supra note 7. 
33. See, e.g .. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. ~30 ( 1982) (holding that a private 
school that received over ninety percent of its funding from government sources was not, 
perforce, a state actor when it fired one of its teachers). 
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and other preconditions to an autonomous life. Comtnunitarians, 
in turn, worry that the "freedom from" construction of rights 
promotes individual irresponsibility. 
The first criticism is plainly important, though it is not the 
primary one advanced by communitarians. Fleming and McClain 
are sympathetic to the progressivism aims of rrLany who find 
liberalism thin gruel for justice. But they also advance the 
argument that liberalism must acknowledge that it works only if 
certain preconditions are met, and they call for progressive 
corrections to our constitutional doctrine and practices that take 
this objection seriously. The baseline of liberal rights need not be 
abandoned, by their account, unless one interprets liberalism 
woodenly to deny the substantive corrections necessary for it to 
be more than an empty promise. Just as constitutional liberalism 
does not deny the costs of freedom, and allows government to 
weigh in on the exercise of rights in ways that promote 
responsibility, it does not disable government from stepping in to 
make liberalism practically feasible and humane. If it did, then 
surely the libertarian hue and cry over too many government 
"entitlements" and creeping socialism would be patently absurd. 
Many important government programs have emerged to support 
those who need assistance, especially children, to assure they 
have meaningful access to goods and services that are relevant to 
liberal autonomy. Existing programs may be woefully 
inadequate to meet the needs, but this is not because liberal 
rights talk prevents new or better ones from being adopted. On 
the contrary, the rights talk often may be useful ways of 
mustering political will to address the needs. The key here is to 
distinguish between liberalism reality and liberalisn1 mythology. 
Realism also requires one to recognize that liberal rights 
discourse may be mobilized in service of progressive ends. As 
Jack Balkin pointed out over two decades ago, even progressives 
who are profoundly skeptical of liberalism tropes in some 
constitutional settings-i.e., because liberalism romanticizes 
individual autonomy, the private sphere, and laissez-faire 
approaches to pre-existing economic and social conditions- still 
may "cling to libertarianism" in other settings because they 
cannot think of any other way to conceptualize the specific 
rights. 34 The stickiness of the libertarian-sounding vocabulary 
should not be confused with the reality of the many 
communitarian and progressive amendments to liberalism that 
34. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 387. 
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pervade constitutional doctrine and government practice, and 
that support the meaningful exercise of liberal rights. In sum, 
rights in the United States are not purely negative rights, and 
liberal rights talk has not made government responsiveness to 
progressive or communitarian dernands impossible. 
Here again, the state action doctrine plays a vital but often 
underappreciated role. Since the 1970s, the Court has retreated 
from earlier civil rights era cases that more readily found 
government involvement in private discrimination sufficient to 
trigger constitutional rights. 35 If federal, state, and local laws that 
apply to private associations intrude further into their autonomy 
than does the Constitution-which they surely do-this is not 
obviously a "communitarian" dilemma that can be explained by 
"too much liberalism." It may be better described as too much 
rights-inflected communitarianism, due to "overregulation" by a 
majority that believes its intrusions into the private sphere are in 
the "common interest." 
C. LIBERTY VERSUS EQUALITY 
A third, false dichotomy is the one sometimes drawn 
between liberty and equality. For some critics of liberalism, the 
heart of the problem is liberalism's inadequate attention to 
private inequality. This argument comes in two basic forms. The 
most muscular form of the critique is that freedom for some will 
always entail less freedom for others, given the unequal 
distribution of power, wealth, and other goods among us. Only 
through redistributive measures and the rejection of strong 
liberalism principles can the agonizing inequality concerns be 
addressed. Liberalism itself is the cord that must be cut, in order 
to usher in a more progressive form of constitutional justice. For 
example, freedom of speech should be analyzed in light of 
unequal access to it, and government should be permitted to 
make significant adjustments to level the discourse playing field 
without worrying about traditional liberalism objections to these 
moves. To get there, substantive equality must become the first-
tier constitutional concern, rather than beginning with an 
assumption of freedom from government action as the primary 
measure of constitutional liberty or invoking strictly liberal 
constructions of equality (i.e., same treatment, hut not same 
outcomes), and then adding equalizing corrections. 
35. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). with Moose 
Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
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The second form of the equality critique of liberalism is less 
adventurous. Here, the critique is not that governrnent cannot 
respond to inequality because liberal assumptions bar these 
interventions; rather, it is that the liberal presumptions operate 
until they are pierced, and the piercing decisions often are 
unfair. The n1ythology of self-sufficient, liberal autonomous 
actors is maintained whenever it serves the interests of those in 
power. When liberalism does not serve these interests, however, 
government acts n1ore swiftly to offer assistance even if doing so 
is the antithesis of libertarian laissez-faire rhetoric. Liberal rights 
thus may conflict with equal rights, but they do so selectively and 
contextually rather than inherently. The proper goal should be 
liberal rights for all, not just for some, and reasonably equal 
access to the baseline tools and conditions necessary to 
participate effectively in a liberal democratic society. 
Fleming and McClain embrace the latter view. In other 
words, they see the liberty versus equality dichotmny, like the 
foregoing ones, as a false one. Nothing about constitutional 
liberalism principles per se rules out equality adjustments. 
Liberal rights do not exist in a social vacuum, and preexisting 
conditions matter a lot to the exercise of rights. Ordering of 
liberal rights in a pluralistic society thus may require more than 
the procedural correction of taking turns; it may entail ceding 
one's own liberal space, time, money, and freedoms in order to 
accommodate others' needs. But this redistribution of goods 
does not mean we abandon our liberal aspirations; it means we 
keep our progressive and communitarian wits about us and be 
vigilant to make corrections necessary to leveling the liberal 
playing field. Liberty and equality, by this account, are 
interdependent. 
On a doctrinal level, of course, the Court has recognized 
that liberty and equality are intertwined. The original Bill of 
Rights nowhere cites equal protection of law, yet the Court in 
Bolling v. Sharpe asserted that "the concepts of equal protection 
and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of 
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. "36 Indeed, no decent liberal 
order can exist without a thin version of equality, at the very 
least, if not a more robust form that requires affirmative action 
and that is aggressively anti-caste. 
36. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347U.S. 497, 49R-99 (1954). 
2013] SOME REALISM 397 
D. MINIMALISM VERSUS PERFECTIONISM: "THIN" VERSUS 
"THICK" RIGHTS 
A final false dichotomy that Fleming and McClain examine 
is the one drawn between minimal and perfectionist, or ''thin" 
versus "thick" versions of constitutional liberalism. In this 
section, they focus in particular on the work of Michael Sandel, 
who argues that liberal justifications for liberal rights are too 
thin, and of Cass R. Sunstein, who makes the con1peting claim 
that they may be too thick (pp. 207-36). 
As the authors show, however, constitutional liberalism in 
practice is both thick and thin. It makes very different demands, 
depending on the context and applicable set of competing 
concerns, and it might best be described as a form of mild 
perfectionism, which Fleming and McClain endorse. The 
practice is fairly non-intrusive into the political process, typically 
moves incrementally, not precipitously, and anticipates a balance 
of constitutional interests. 
The least that constitutional liberalism requires is captured 
by the so-called "rational basis" standard of judicial review, 
under which courts strongly defer to government actors absent a 
showing that their decisions are grossly excessive, arbitrary and 
capricious, or inspired by baseless animus.17 The most that 
constitutional liberalism requires is captured by the so-called 
"strict" or "exacting" scrutiny standard of judicial review, 
triggered by "fundamental" rights1x and "suspect" classifica-
tions.3l) In these cases, the government bears the burden of 
proving that its actions promote a compelling or significant 
government purpose and that the measures are narrowly tailored 
to advance that purpose. 
On the thin, rational basis end of the liberty spectrum the 
courts do very little to interfere with the political community's 
policy decisions. As such, they are mindful of the Sunstein 
concern about judicial minimalism and potential backlash. This 
is so despite libertarian concerns about government programs 
that unduly burden liberty and property interests, and despite 
progressive concerns about the relative absence of meaningful or 
"thicker" constitutional protection of rights for the poor, and for 
37. See, e.g, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla .. 34X U.S. 4X3, 4X9 (1955) (setting 
forth rational basis standard for judicial review of socioeconomic legislation). 
3X. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 3X6 (197R) (describing the right to 
marry as a fundamental right that triggers elevated judicial scrutiny). 
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (stating that strict 
scrutiny applies to all government racial classifications). 
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other vulnerable classes of persons. Yet even the rational basis 
end of the spectrum is fanned. It ranges from its "toothless" 
version of nearly uncritical deference to a more searching 
inquiry into governmental reasons, based upon the importance 
of the interest at stake, the political vulnerability of the 
burdened persons, and any strong whiff of animus against them. 
When judicial review is at its thinnest, it still stands as a 
reminder that government actors are expected to observe 
baseline rationality and that courts reserve theoretical power to 
compel this, in particularly egregious cases. 
On the thick, fundamental rights end of the spectrum, 
courts are more aggressive and betray some of the liberal 
perfectionism that Sandel admires and Glendon and Sunstein 
fear. But courts still consider political community interests as 
part of the rights calculus. Just as rational basis has a thick end, 
strict scrutiny has a thin one. 
In short, neither pure minimalism not pure perfectionism 
governs at either end of the rights spectrum, or even within the 
applicable categories. Judges locate liberal rights in "tiers," but 
also on a continuum. Formalists might prefer less float in the 
process, or a meatier thumb on either side of the minimalism 
versus perfectionism scale, but the current constitutional case 
law respects neither desire. 
This means that constitutional rights can begin on one end 
of the spectrum, and slowly migrate to the other end over time, 
as cultural understanding of the liberty interests at stake evolves. 
A thin, liberal justification for a right typically initiates the 
movement-say, a strong libertarian argument against criminal-
izing same-sex sodomy between two consenting adults in the 
privacy of their own home where no showing of tangible harm to 
others is made. But it can eventually ripen into a thicker, more 
perfectionist and value-laden justification for a related aspect of 
that minimalist right, such as the refusal to countenance private 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by denying 
public funds to those who practice such discrimination, or official 
respect for the relationship by allowing same-sex partners to 
marry. A thin liberal right thereby may ripen into thick, 
fundamental status under which the conduct and the people 
thought to be defined by the conduct are rnore explicitly 
affirnzed, not just protected from physical harmt or imprison-
ment. But even when a right attains fundamental status, as 
reproductive rights and freedom of speech prove, the 
government still may moralize about the exercise of the right. 
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The liberal right to do something is not necessarily the right to 
be respected for it. Liberal rights obviously may hasten the 
process of gaining cultural approbation of the protected 
behavior, but they rarely are granted before cultural tolerance of 
the behavior has begun. In a plural society, one should not 
expect that the former will always follow from the latter, but the 
latter almost always precedes the former in any event. 
Constitutional liberalism reflects these contextually and 
temporally variable aspects of rights. Our most partisan divides 
tend to trigger what Dan Kahan has called "thin walls 
liberalism,"40 under which the most we can expect of each other 
is the behavior of people who live in "a building with thin 
walls."41 In this liberal order, citizens "avoid the types of 
advocacy-akin to behaving raucously in a room that abuts one's 
neighbor's bedroom- that foreclose or impede the efforts of 
other groups to form understandings of law affirming to them. "42 
At the least, we must "keep our voices down" as we exercise our 
own liberal rights in our own apartments. But we do have the 
right to live there. Tolerance, not respect, governs- but just 
barely. 
On the other, thicker end of our liberal community 
aspirations we expect more than live-and-let-live, barely tolerant 
neighbors in a metaphorical urban apartment building: we seek a 
liberal order in which our fellow citizens know us, respect us, 
look out for our children, elect us to leadership roles, and 
include us in their thicker community embrace- especially when 
we are down on our luck. 
But again, first-wave rights bearers often will settle for 
tolerance and thin walls- the right to live there- especially if the 
choice is between no rights and minimum rights. Moreover, the 
gestation period of the thicker version of rights (i.e., rights 
justified by more than strictly libertarian justifications) can be 
generations; such perfectionism, even in its early or "mild" form, 
may lie just beyond the reach of a living human's grasp. 
Consequently, thin walls liberalism is nothing to sneer at, is often 
hard won, and would be a lot to lose. First-wave rights bearers 
know this, and rarely take their first-step, liberal rights gains for 
40. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 147-48 
(2007). 
41. !d. 
42. !d. at 148. 
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granted, or make liberal perfectionism the enen1y of a liberal 
good. 
The primary point, for Fleming and McClain's purposes, is 
that our constitutional liberalism includes both ends of the 
liberal rights continuum. The questions of when and where thin 
versions of rights should suffice, or thicker rights are called for, 
can be extremely divisive. The answers, however, are not 
obviously implied by invoking perfectionism or noinimalism per 
se. 
E. RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY \'ERSUS 
RESPONSIBILITY AS AUTONOMY 
The authors do an excellent job of disclosing why the 
foregoing dichotomies are false. Yet they introduce one of their 
own, which suffers frorn similar weaknesses. Specifically, they 
attempt to rescue liberalism from the charge of irresponsibility 
by claiming that there are "two different, although related," 
meanings of responsibility: "responsibility as accountability to 
community versus responsibility as autonorny, or self-
government, respectively" (p. 21 ). They elaborate on these 
concepts as follows: 
As we use the terms, "responsibility as accountability" 
connotes being answerable to others for the manner and 
consequences of the exercise of one's rights, whereas 
''responsibility as autonomy" connotes self-governance, that 
is, entrusting the right-holder to exercise moral responsibility 
in making decisions guided by conscience and deliberation (p. 
21 ). 
The saving phrase here may be "although related .. ,, Nevertheless, 
the authors seem to believe the two concepts are sufficiently 
distinguishable to rest considerable weight on the distinction. 
Responsibility as autonomy, they continue, allows government 
to encourage reflective decision making without steering a person 
toward one choice or another (p. 68). For example, "balanced 
counseling" regarding whether to seek an abortion may be 
allowed (p. 68), but not governmental coercion or persuasion 
premised on paternalistic notions of women's incapacity to make 
independent decisions (p. 73). 
I do not buy this distinction. The line between balanced, 
government measures that support reflective decision making 
and those that feel skewed in favor of government value choices 
and coercive is hopelessly fuzzy, subjective, and difficult to 
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isolate. One man's information about adoption options may be 
another woman's sermon against an early term abortion. 
Likewise, one parent's liberal-inspired civic education may be 
another's illiberal inculcation of secular humanism. 43 There is no 
such thing as neutral government education, or a neutral 
formative project. Even balance among non-neutral views 
relevant to the exercise of a right is difficult to achieve, given the 
time limited and didactic nature of counseling and of education. 
This does not mean, however, that a non-coercion 
aspiration is meaningless, or that the liberalis1n insight is 
irrelevant to government approaches to its educative role. To say 
that we are influenced and shaped by our liberal democratic 
government, that government can and does moralize, or that 
rights and responsibilities are intertwined in a liberal democratic 
order, does not mean we do not ever invoke or draw the line 
between legitimate persuasion and illegitimate coercion. It 
means that the distinction between "responsibility as autonomy'' 
and "responsibility as accountability" is subjective, and that 
Fleming and McClain do not prove that government abortion 
counseling necessarily crosses that newly-coined line. At some 
point, the theorist, teacher, or judge must make the leap, despite 
the inescapable subjectivity and value-inflection problem. In this 
particular case, I happen to agree with Fleming and McClain's 
judgment call, just not with their justification that it turns on a 
clear distinction between responsibility as autonomy versus 
responsibility as accountability. 
The more important- and to me more convincing- feature 
of the distinction between these two forms of responsibility is 
that responsibility as autonomy more emphatically focuses 
attention on the liberal concern about coercion. It cautions 
government actors that liberalism presumes adult decision 
makers' autonomy, even as it anticipates some government 
influence on the exercise of that autonomy. It even presumes 
that children have rights, however limited, and are best treated 
with a liberal respect for their emerging capacity for self-
governance. For liberal rights advocates like Fleming and 
McClain, this is a crucial reminder. It may curb government 
enthusiasm for more explicitly directive, paternalistic or 
43. This notion is captured beautifully by the enduringly insightful work of Nomi 
Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, 
and the Paradox ofa Liheral f,'ducation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993). 
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moralistic interventions, and it confronts directly the paradox of 
any "liberal education" agenda. 
III. BEYOND FALSE DICHOTOMIES? 
If these are all false dichotomies, and our constitutional 
liberalism is broad enough to embrace liberal rights and 
communitarian and progressive critiques of their perceived 
limitations and excesses, then what's the root of the 
philosophical debates outlined here? Is it that Glendon simply 
misreads the doctrine, that Sandel expects more perfectionism in 
practice than the doctrine currently can deliver in selected cases, 
or that Sunstein expects too little of rights and over-predicts 
backlash based on isolated examples? Or is it that all of these 
writers are fundamentally moderate, as are Fleming and 
McClain, such that the theoretical differences between their 
takes on liberal rights are relatively modest, and can be 
accommodated within constitutional doctrine in ways that more 
radical communitarian, liberal, or progressive accounts could 
not? 
I believe this last explanation is a major part of the answer. 
This book is a friendly amendment to Glendon-style 
communitarianism, and a mid-ground negotiation between 
Sandel's perfectionism and Sunstein's minimalism. One can 
easily imagine all five of these scholars on a panel, addressing 
the political hot button topics of same-sex marriage, abortion, 
and hate speech without a raised voice or failure to grasp-really 
grasp-each other's points. They would not need to rely on thin 
walls liberalism to engage one another's arguments, even where 
they diverge on the preferred outcomes or ways of justifying 
them. Their discussion is occurring within a quite congenial and 
thick community discourse circle. 
Can the same be said of the rest of us, in this election year? 
Would reading Fleming and McClain's respectful intervention 
make less moderate, less informed citizens better able to see 
how constitutional rights and responsibilities can co-exist? Might 
"we" be able to talk to each other about these same political 
wedge issues, not just past each other, by invoking this fuller 
account of our constitutional liberalism? Or are academic texts 
like this beside the political point, no matter how accessibly they 
are written? 
I think books like this do matter, and not simply because of 
an occupational predisposition to think so. Scholars are not the 
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only ones currently engaged in the project of defending or 
reimagining our constitutional liberalism at a deeper level. Some 
of the efforts are silo-specific arguments to undo Roe v. Wade44 
or Citizens United v. FEC,45 or to take Lawrence v. Texas46 to the 
next level by extending the protected right to same-sex marriage. 
But a growing number of people are arguing for tectonic changes 
in constitutional law, and some even favor a second 
constitutional convention.47 America today thus may be poised 
for a full-on public discussion of our constitutional liberalism, 
and Ordered Liberty may improve these public deliberations 
because it offers a more nuanced way of thinking about the 
potential benefits and costs of pitching big pieces of our 
constitutional liberalism, or pulling it up at the roots. The book 
shows the complexities and paradoxes of our constitutional law 
as it is, and therefore offers a saner, more realistic starting point 
for political arguments than many of the almost cartoonish 
hyperbole in some political discourse. It presents the current law, 
and the scholarly writing about that law, in a fair-minded and 
non-distorted manner. 
The book also reveals the fuller arc of that law. If anything, 
Fleming and McClain's work may be too brief in this last respect. 
The authors omit significant other doctrines that also support 
their claim about the room for liberal rights and responsibility. 
For example, they might have added a longer account of the 
steady narrowing of the Establishment Clause brake on 
government accommodation of religion, which allows moral 
communities to seek government funding for religious 
education, faith-based charities, and other forms of official 
support for sectarian ends.48 They also might have spent greater 
time on the state action conundrum, with its emphasis on the 
private/public split, or the transfer of government functions to 
private actors, both of which create a vast opening for private 
actors to pursue their non-neutral ends with no constitutional 
oversight whatsoever, and often with significant government 
support. 
Still another useful topic might have been the many 
procedural and jurisdictional barriers to judicial protection of 
44. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
45. 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
46. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
47. See, e.g., RESTORING FREEDOM, www.restoringfrecdom.on' (last visited Apr. 
17, 2013); ROOTSTRIKERS, www.rootstrikers.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
48. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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constitutional rights, which tame liberal rights.49 And they may 
have expanded their discussion of how the Court in recent years 
has fortified, not restricted, freedom of association rights in ways 
that support private intermediate associations' ~ight to set 
membership rules in ways that exclude some groups. ~o 
A fully panoptic view of our constitutional liberalism would 
reveal that it enforces (again, contextually and on a continuum) 
a range of liberty-protective principles that rein in government 
excesses: procedural and political process regularity, separation 
of powers, prospectiv~ty and pro~ort_i~nali!( in. lawmaking, 
transparency, and an Independent JUdiciary. VVhtch of these 
liberal values has been pursued in unduly aggressive ways that 
undermine our collective sense of responsibility for the common 
good? Where, exactly, should the constitutional liberalisn1 cord 
be cut, shortened, or strengthened? 
Finally, the authors might have discussed the chipping away 
at public schools' race-conscious affirmative action strategies by 
the modern Court.52 If the post-1960s civil rights revolution really 
is to blame for our alleged cultural decline, then what should we 
make of post-1991 (the year that the Glendon book, Rights Talk, 
was published) constitutional developments that belie the claim 
that civil rights are expanding? 
More realism about our constitutional liberalism thus would 
be extremely useful, especially in this election year in which all 
political sides are waving the constitutional flag. i\ fresh start to 
political discussions about how we might need to move forward, 
or backward, or even to the side in our liberal rights regime 
would ask the discussants to consider the doctrinal evidence 
about what our liberal rights practice currently is, and whether it 
in fact is protecting rights at the expense of responsibilities. 
49. An example is standing doctrine. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. 
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (holding that taxpayers lacked constitutional standing to 
challenge a tax credit, versus a tax expenditure, on Establishment Clause grounds). 
50. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
51. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS 
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (manuscript on file with author) (discussing the 
shared liberal democratic values that "due process" protects). 
52. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) (striking down race-conscious measures aimed at reducing racial isolation in 
public school student population). See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., U.S. Supreme Court 
Case. No. 11-345 (pending affirmative action case involving the University of Texas). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
I am well aware, as are Fleming and McClain, that liberal 
rights talk can obfuscate as well as illuminate on the ground 
real.ities. ~rogressiv~s' disgust with the obf~scatorx c~nsequences 
of hberahsm rhetonc should be taken senously.· · L1kew1se, the 
non-neutral, perfectionist ends that many progressives favor 
remain unmet-especially the promise of protection of non-
majority voices and concerns. We therefore should continue to 
advance progressive correctives that save liberalism from itself. 
But liberalism rhetoric is neither the obvious cause of these 
injustices, nor the wrong tool for attacking them. Faith in 
liberalism-even misplaced faith-not only can be used to 
advance progressive ends but is the language we currently have to 
work with in pursuing these substantive ends. That familiar and 
available language is, for the reasons Fleming and McClain 
demonstrate, much richer and more nuanced than some of its 
critics claim. It also has been instrumental in achieving some 
quite admirable liberal democratic advances, including ones that 
advance equal rights. Again, first-wave rights bearers may know 
this best of all, and thus are often reluctant to toss aside the 
constitutional and rhetorical tools that helped them to achieve 
these hard fought victories. 
Last, but surely not least, liberal rights talk insists, perhaps 
more than any of its more self-consciously value-inflected 
competitors, that we consider the possibility that everything we 
currently believe 1nay be wrong. This is a valuable but 
perpetually repressed insight that is especially useful in a 
culturally and ideologically plural nation. A constitutional 
starting point that stresses our intellectual and other human 
frailties and reg uires us to reconsider our preconceptions and 
convictions has real value in opening our eyes to new insights, as 
any teacher, scientist, or political activist understands. Liberal 
neutrality may well be a myth, but it also is an intellectual 
framework that may be pitched at our peril. The many flaws of 
our constitutional liberalism- paradoxically and ironically-may 
be best revealed only if we invoke its obviously flawed 
"marketplace" political discourse principles, its easily mocked 
53. A recent critique of liberalism's emphasis on the "free market" myth makes this 
point very powerfully. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: 
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). Cf LEFT LiBERALISM/LEFT 
CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown and Janet Halley eds., 2002) (discussing the left political 
project and tensions between critiques of liberalism and pursuit of legal remedies). 
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agnosticism about substantive ends, and its uneven respect for 
procedural regularity. Unless and until we develop a better set of 
first principles, we thus might do well to maintain the liberal 
framework we have, and continue to use its vocabulary to press 
our competing claims for better and non-neutral outcomes. At 
the least, liberalism requires us to begin with respect for others' 
right to disagree about these non-neutral ends. 
Fleming and McClain demonstrate this kind of liberalism-
rooted respect for others' notions about what ends we should 
pursue. True, they are engaging others who thenaselves respect 
these discourse rules, and who operate within an academic 
American "rights talk" culture that is relatively tight. True, their 
"mild perfectionism" arguments are unlikely to persuade non-
liberal, or more radical liberal theorists and political activists to 
n1ove toward their precise version of ordered liberty. But the 
authors do an excellent job of responding to the claim that 
constitutional liberalism is the cause of the alleged rise of 
individual irresponsibility, by setting forth an account of 
constitutional liberalism that is based on doctrinal reality. This 
realism about our constitutional liberalism is a correction that 
most Americans-even across the political spectrum-can and 
should heed. 
Finally, the authors maintain this liberalism-rooted respect 
for opponents' arguments even when discussing political wedge 
issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Their 
commitment to liberal tolerance- thin and thick-- fortifies their 
ability to engage in respectful political discourse54 about these 
and other, especially divisive constitutional concerns, and to give 
their opponents' arguments a fair hearing. Amidst the din of 
increasingly negative campaign speech, outrage news, cyber-
echo-chambers, and other gross distortions of political discourse, 
theirs is a welcome intervention in tone as well as content. 
For all of these reasons, the book makes an admirable 
contribution to a most timely and fundamental debate. It would 
be a terrific step forward in a political culture premised on self-
governance if the various patriot armies marching under 
American constitutional banners would pause a moment to read 
it. 
54. For an elaboration of principles of civil political discourse, and emerging 
evidence on the consequences of extreme incivility for democratic engagement. see 
Massaro & Stryker, supra note 17. 
